University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 42
Number 1 Fall 2011

Article 4

2011

Comment: Innocence and Incarceration: A
Comprehensive Review of Maryland's
Postconviction DNA Relief Statute and
Suggestions for Improvement
Nicholas Phillips

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Phillips, Nicholas (2011) "Comment: Innocence and Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of Maryland's Postconviction DNA
Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 42 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol42/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

COMMENT
INNOCENCE AND INCARCERATION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW OF MARYLAND'S POSTCONVICTION DNA
RELIEF STATUTE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
IMPROVEMENT
By: Nicholas Phillips'
1.

INTRODUCTION

I

n 1989 Gary Dotson became the first person in the United States to be
exonerated of his crime through the use of DNA technology.l After
being convicted in 1979 of rape and aggravated kidnapping, Dotson was cleared after DNA testing conclusively proved that spermatozoa found on
the alleged victim's underwear could not have come from Dotson, but
may have come from the victim's boyfriend at the time. 2 In light of the
uncovered evidence, the State's Attorney's Office declined to retry the
case. 3 Since then, 272 other names have been cleared after testing of
biological evidence either established their innocence or seriously
undermined the validity of their conviction. 4 While criminal convictions
carry a presumption of validity, 5 DNA technology conclusively identifies
• J.D. Candidate, 2012. I would like to thank the staff of the University of Baltimore
Law Forum for all of their hard work. 1 would also like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor
Byron L. Warnken, for his assistance and wisdom. Finally, a special thanks to my parents,
Andrew and Teresa, and the rest of my family and friends for their support, encouragement,
and confidence in me throughout law school.
I
Gary
Dotson,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.orgl
ContentlGary_Dotson.php (last visited Oct. 19,2011). While Dotson was released in August
1989, the conviction of David Vasquez for murder was reversed in January 1989. David
Vasquez, MID-ATLANTIC INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.exonerate.orglother-Iocalvictories/david-vasquez! (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). However, Vasquez was exonerated after
the police and FBI tested evidence in similar crimes because DNA testing of evidence used to
convict Vasquez proved inconclusive. David Vasquez, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
The
innocenceproject.orgiContentlDavid_Vasquez.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
distinction between Vasquez and Dotson is that Vasquez was cleared after law enforcement
officials conclusively linked to the already committed Timothy Spencer, also known as the
South Side Strangler, crimes carried out in the exact same fashion as the crime thought to have
David Vasquez, MID-ATLANTIC INNOCENCE PROJECT,
been committed by Vasquez.
http://www.exonerate.orglother-Iocal-victories/david-vasquezl;
http://www.exonerate.orgl
other-Iocal-victories/david-vasquezl (last visited Oct. 19,2011).
2
3

/d.
/d.

4
Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.orglknow/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
5
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 499 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)).

65

66

U Diversity of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 42.1

individuals and makes it possible, in certain circumstances, to exonerate
an individual who was wrongfully convicted of a crime. 6
In 1993 Kirk Bloodsworth became the first death row inmate to be
exonerated by postconviction DNA testing. 7 Bloodsworth was convicted
eight years earlier in Baltimore County, Maryland of killing and sexually
assaulting a nine-year-old girl.8 DNA evidence collected from the crime
scene eventually proved that Bloodsworth did not commit the crime. 9 As
a result, Bloodsworth's exoneration generated significant media attention
and public interest about the death penalty and wrongful convictions,
especially in Maryland. 10
Because of its proven reliability, DNA evidence is now admissible in
all trial courts in the United States. ll Shortly after DNA testing proved
reliable, states began enacting postconviction relief statutes specifically to
aid inmates in proving their innocence through DNA analysis. In 1994
New York enacted the nation's first postconviction DNA testing statute. 12
By 2004 the federal government and thirty-two states, including
Maryland, enacted statutes providing for postconviction DNA relief. 13
Today almost every jurisdiction in the United States allows criminals to
challenge the factual validity of their convictions through DNA testing. 14
In Maryland, there are numerous limitations on the accessibility and
scope of postconviction DNA relief. While Maryland law provides relief
under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, and other similar

6
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 2 (1999),
available at https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnij/177626.pdf [hereinafter FUTURE OF DNA
EVIDENCE]. While DNA can help to free the falsely convicted, prosecutors can also use DNA
to establish the guilt of the accused at trial. Id.
7
Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
Kirk Bloodsworth.php (last visited Oct. 19,2011).
8" Id. On appeal, Bloodsworth's conviction was reversed and remanded and he was
subsequently sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. Id.; see also Bloodsworth v. State,
307 Md. 164,512 A.2d 1056 (1986), remanded to 76 Md. App. 23, 543 A.2d 382 (1988), cert.
denied, 313 Md. 688, 548 A.2d 128 (1988).
9
Bloodsworth, supra note 7. Genetic material found on the victim's undergarments,
presumed to belong to the assailant, revealed spermatozoa that did not match Bloodsworth's
DNA profile. Id.
10
See Rob Hiassen, The Second Life ofKirk Bloodsworth, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 30,
2000, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylandibal-profile07300 0,0,2351215.story.
II FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at I. While there is a common misconception
that DNA technology identifies a particular individual, DNA testing works to exclude
individuals based on a comparison to the original source. ld. at 21.
12
Blake v. State (Blake /),395 Md. 213, 219, 909 A.2d 1020,1023 (2006) (citing N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(I-a) (McKinney 2006».
13
Blake 1, 395 Md. at 218, 909 A.2d at 1023 n. 4.
14
Nancy Ritter, Postconviction DNA Testing Is at Core of Major NIl Initiatives, 262 NIJ
J. 18, 19 (2009), https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijl225758.pdf.
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statutes,15 weaknesses in section 8-201 tend to limit its usefulness to
inmates who are actually innocent. 16 At the same time, such deficiencies
could theoretically lead to the release of an inmate who is factually guilty
of the crime for which he was convicted, but is nevertheless able to seek
relief by this statute. 17 Part II of this paper will survey Maryland's
Postconviction DNA Relief statute and discuss the decisions by the
Maryland appellate courts relating to section 8-20l. In Part III, similar
statutes allowing postconviction relief through DNA testing will be
evaluated to provide a broader context of the state of the law as it relates
to DNA testing and its relevance to the postconviction process. Part IV
will give a more detailed analysis of the Maryland statute, and will
identify portions of the statutory scheme that may be improved.

II. MARYLAND'S POSTCONVICTION DNA RELIEF STATUTE
A. Filing the Petition

Pursuant to Maryland law,- persons convicted of murder,
manslaughter, rape, or a sexual offense ls may file a petition for DNA
testing of biological evidence '9 related to their conviction,20 or for a law
enforcement database search to identify the source of tested physical
evidence?1 The petition must indicate where the charging document was
filed, the date and location of trial, the offenses for which the petitioner

15
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-20I(b) (West 2009). An inmate may file a petition
for DNA testing "[nJotwithstanding any other law governing postconviction relief' which
would include appeals filed under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act. See generally
CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to 109. Inmates may also seek to prove their innocence via a petition
for writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. CRIM. PROC. § 8-301.
Unlike a postconviction DNA relief petition, a petition for writ of actual innocence allows the
introduction of new evidence unavailable at the time of the trial. Jd. Additionally, section 830 I allows the court to set aside a verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct a sentence.
Jd.; see also CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (limiting remedy to a new trial).
16
See discussion infra Part IV.
17
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
18
CRIM. PROC., § 8-201(b) (specifically limiting offenses for which DNA testing is
permitted); see generally MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-201, 2-204, 2-207, 3-303-06
(West 2011).
19
CRIM. PROC. § 8-20I(a)(2) ("[bJiological evidence includes but is not strictly limited
to, blood, hair, saliva, semen, epithelial cells, buccal cells, or other bodily substances from
which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.").
20
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b)(l). The petition must be filed in the circuit court where the
charging document was filed. MD. R. 4-703(b).
21
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b)(2). For example, a court may order a DNA databank search
when an apprehended criminal used a similar modus operandi as allegedly used by the
petitioner. Upon an order being granted, a "cold hit" may appear in the system, thus linking
the unknown crime scene DNA to a DNA profile of another individual already in a DNA
database. ld.
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was convicted, and the sentence imposed. 22 Further, it must also describe
with particularity all previous proceedings, including appeals, motions,
postconvictions, and other collateral proceedings. 23 Lastly, the petition
must also contain a description of the evidence the petitioner wishes to
have tested24 and how such evidence is factually related to the petitioner's
claim of innocence. 25 In sum, the petitioner needs to describe the factual
basis for the claim that the State has custody of the evidence or that it
could be acquired from a third party by court order, a description of how
the evidence relates to the conviction, and that a reasonable probability
exists that testing may provide exculpatory or mitigating evidence
relevant to the wrongful conviction or sentencing. 26 The court may also
grant a motion to withdraw the petition.27 After the petitioner files the
motion, the clerk of court must send copies to the State's Attorney,
county administrative judge, and if the petitioner claims they are indigent,
the Office of the Public Defender?8
Upon receipt of the petition, the State's Attorney must either file an
answer to the petition or a motion to transfer due to improper venue. 29
The answer must first address whether the evidence sought by the
petitioner exists and is appropriate for DNA testing. 3o If the State
contends that the evidence cannot be located, it must indicate what efforts
were made to locate the evidence, including locations that were searched,
the search procedure, and the names and business addresses of

22
MD. R. 4-704(a)(1 )(8). Petitions may be amended to the extent that they serve the
interest of justice. MD. R. § 4-704(b).
23
MD. R. 4-704(a)(1)(C). This includes the location and case number of each
proceeding as well as the dates of decisions and determinations made during each proceeding.
Id. A statement must also be made about whether the petitioner is able to pay the cost of
testing and hire counsel. MD. R. 4-704(a)(1)(D). If indigent, the petitioner may request that
the court appoint counsel. /d.
24
MD. R. 4-704(a)(2)(A); see also Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 972 A.2d 1012 (2009)
(petition sufficiently described items to be tested when it alleged that jacket, shoes, pants, belt
and socks collected from crime scene may produce exculpatory evidence).
25
MD. R. 4-704(a)(2)(8).
26
/d. If known, the petitioner must also state the type of DNA testing desired and a
statement of how such testing is generally accepted by the scientific community. MD. R. 4704(a)(2)(C).
27
MD. R. 4-704(c). The withdrawal shall be without prejudice if filed before DNA
testing is ordered, and if an order has been issued, the withdrawal shall be with prejudice
unless the court orders otherwise after finding good cause. !d.
28
MD. R. 4-705. If the evidence is not suitable for DNA testing, the State must give the
reasons why. MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(A).
29
MD. R. 4-706(a). A motion to transfer venue must be filed within 30 days of the
receipt of the petition. MD. R. 4-706(b)(1). An answer must be filed within 60 days of receipt
of the petition or within 60 days after the denial of a motion to transfer venue. MD. R. 4706(c)(I).
30
MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(A).
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individuals involved in search efforts. 3 1 If the State contends that the
evidence has been destroyed, it is required to describe the legal
requirements regarding the destruction of such evidence and whether the
appropriate protocols were followed. 32 Additionally, the answer must
either supply documentation, if it exists, stating that evidence relevant to
the claim of innocence was properly destroyed, or state the reasons for
noncompliance. 33 Finally, the answer must respond to every allegation
contained in the petition. 34 After considering the State's answer, the court
can deny the petition if it finds either that the petitioner has no standing to
make the claim or the facts alleged do not entitle the petitioner to any
relief. 35 A petitioner has the option of filing a response to challenge the
sufficiency or accuracy of the answer or to amend the petition itself. 36
Until 2009, a petitioner in Maryland filing a motion for postconviction
DNA testing did not have a right to the assistance of counsel. 3? Looking
to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that there is
no right to counsel in collateral attacks on criminal convictions. 38 While
the Maryland Constitution does not guarantee any right to counsel for
collateral attacks,39 the Court of Appeals of Maryland indicated that if a
provision guaranteeing a right to counsel was enacted by the Maryland

MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(B).
MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(C).
33
1d.
34 MD. R. 4-706(c )(2)(D).
35
MD. R. 4-707(a). However, once a petItioner presents a prima facie case of
entitlement to relief, the court may not summarily deny the petition without a hearing. Simms
v. State, 409 Md. 722, 731,976 A.2d 1012, 1018 (2009). In one case, sufficient facts were
alleged when petitioner, after being convicted of murder, claimed bloody clothing at crime
scene collected from crime scene, believed to be that of the assailant would not have any of
his DNA on them. ld. at 733, 976 A.2d at 1019; see also Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 71920, 976 A.2d 999, 1011 (2009) (where the petitioner alleged prima facie case when, after
being convicted of murder, that epithelial cells found on the gun's trigger would not contain
his DNA).
36
MD. R. 4-708. This provision also states that the petitioner may request, after filing a
petition under section 8-201(b)(2) of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article, a broader
search of DNA databases if the purpose is to identifY the source of physical evidence which
was used for DNA testing. Jd
37
See Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 508, 929 A.2d 501, 511 (2007); Blake l, 395 Md. at
234-37,909 A.2d at 1032-34.
38 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("[A defendant] has no such
right [to counsel] when attacking, in postconviction proceedings, a conviction that has long
since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process.").
39
See Blake 1, 395 Md. at 235, 909 A.2d at 1033. Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, which operates as the functional equivalent to the right to counsel
found in the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution, is interpreted in pari materia
with the 6th Amendment, and is not interpreted any broader for the purpose of providing
counsel after a direct appeal. E.g., Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 245-46, 513 A.2d 299,
306 (1986).
31

32
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Legislature, it would be upheld. 40 As of 2009, a court must appoint
counsel to the petitioner if the motion is not denied unless counsel for the
petitioner has already entered his or her appearance. 41 As a result, first
time petitioners for postconviction relief have a statutory right to
counse1. 42
B. The Hearing Stage

The court must hold a htaring on the petition if it determines the
petitioner has standing and finds any of the following factors: (1) that the
evidence related to a judgment of conviction exists and there is, or may
be; a reasonable probability that DNA testing may produce exculpatory
evidence related to conviction or sentencing; (2) the State contends that
the evidence cannot be located and a genuine dispute exists as to whether
the search was adequate43 ; (3) the State contends that the evidence was
destroyed and a genuine dispute exists as to whether the destruction
conformed to protocol or was lawful; or (4) the State is unable to produce
evidence it was required to preserve under section 8-201(i)(1).44 When
the State alleges that the evidence requested for testing no longer exists or
cannot be found, a petitioner must be given an opportunity to respond to
the State's assertion45 for reasons of fundamental faimess. 46
40
See Blake I, 395 Md. at 235, 909 A.2d at 1033 ("Any right to counsel appellant may
have under the DNA testing statute must be found in [section] 8-201 [of the Maryland
Criminal Procedure article].").
41
MD. R. 4-707(b). Counsel must be appointed within 30 days after the State files its
answer. Id.
42
CRIM. PROC. § 7-108(a). If a postconviction proceeding is reopened under section 7104, whether the petitioner is provided with counsel is left to the discretion of the court. Id.
Thus, the petitioner would be guaranteed a lawyer only if a postconviction proceeding is
opened for the first time upon favorable DNA results.
43
See Blake v. State (Blake II), 418 Md. 445,462, 15 A.3d 787, 797 (201 I) (hiring
outside company to perform search of police evidence unit and State's Attorney's Office
sufficient to satisfy State's search burden); Horton v. State, 412 Md. 1, 15,985 A.2d 540, 548
(2009) (search efforts insufficient when, after some investigation, the petitioner narrowly
tailors particular areas where a search should be continued); Arey, 400 Md. at 503, 929 A.2d
at 508 (search of evidence control unit insufficient to show that evidence doesn't exist); Blake
1, 395 Md. at 227, 909 A.2d at 1028 (memorandum from evidence clerk stating that property
did not exist insufficient to show nonexistence). The burden is on the State to establish that
the evidence in question no longer exists. Id.
44
MD. R. 4-709(a); see also Gregg, 409 Md. at 721, 976 A.2d at 1012 (once a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief is shown, the trial court lacks discretion to deny a
hearing, appellant made prima facie case after alleging that epithelial cells found on trigger of
firearm used in homicide would not match his DNA, showing that he did not fire it). The
hearing must be held within 90 days after service of response to the State's answer or within
120 days after service of the State's answer if no response is filed. MD. R. 4-709(d). For
discussion about evidence requiring preservation, see infra notes 66, 67 and accompanying
text.
45
Arey, 400 Md. at 505, 929 A.2d at 509; Blake 1, 395 Md. at 222, 909 A.2d at 1025.
46
Blake I, 395 Md. at 228, 909 A.2d at 1028.
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Additionally, the Court mandates the guarantee of a hearing, as the
guarantee exists for other dispositive motion hearings in criminal and
civil cases. 47 Further, due process considerations tend to support the
argument that a hearing is necessary and allowing a hearing is the
practice of other jurisdictions. 48 During the hearing, the burden is on the
state to prove that the evidence in question is missing or no longer
exists. 49 In Blake I, an unsworn memorandum from the officer in charge
of evidence control, stating that the evidence from the case could not be
located, was insufficient to show that evidence in question does not
exist. 50
No hearing is required if the petitioner either lacks standing or if the
facts alleged do not entitle the petitioner to relief as a matter of law. 51 A
court may also elect to hold a hearing in its discretion even if one is not
required. 52 Further, a court may also grant the petition and order DNA
testing without a hearing if there is a written agreement between the
petitioner and the State's Attorney.53 The court must deny the petition,
after conducting a hearing, if it finds that an adequate search was
conducted, the evidence in question does not exist, and that the State did
not willfully destroy evidence it was not required to preserve. 54
Alternatively, the petition must be denied if the method of testing
requested by the petitioner is not generally accepted or if there is no
reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce exculpatory or

47
1d. at 228-32, 909 A.2d at 1028-29. In civil cases, court cannot grant motion for
judgment notwithstanding a verdict, motion for a new trial, motion to amend a judgment, or
other dispositive motion without a hearing if a party so requests. MD. R. 2-311(e) and (t). A
hearing is also required for petitions filed under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act.
MD. R. 4-406.
48
Blake 1,395 Md. at 228-32, 909 A.2d at 1028-31.
49
1d. at 227, 232, 909 A.2d at 1028, 1031. No mention is made, however, of exactly
what the State's burden is. See id. at 227,909 A.2d at 1028. Because scientific evidence must
be preserved under section 8-201(j) of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article, there is a
presumption that the evidence exists and is in the states control. See Blake 1, 395 Md. at 223,
909 A.2d at 1026. Prosecutors should be hesitant to hastily conclude that evidence does not
exist because evidence may be found in many different places like the prosecutors office, state
and local crime laboratories, hospitals and clinics, defense investigators, courthouse evidence
rooms, offices of defense counsel, independent crime laboratories, clerks of court, and court
reporters. 1d. at 221-23,909 A.2d at .1024-25 (citing FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note
6, at 36,46).
50
Blake 1, 395 Md. at 227, 909 A.2d at 1028.
51
MD. R. 4-709(b)(1). If the court does not hold a hearing, the judge must issue a
written order citing the reasons why a hearing is not required. MD. R. 4-709(e).
52 MD. R. 4-709(c).
53
MD. R. 4-709(b )(2). The court must approve the stipulation, and testing must still be
conducted under the provisions of Maryland Rule 4-71O(a)(2)(B). MD. R. 4-709(b )(2).
54
MD. R. 4-710(a)(I)(A).
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mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or
sentencing. 55
C. Testing ofForensic Evidence

DNA testing must be ordered if the court finds that identification
evidence related to a judgment of conviction exists and there is a
reasonable probability56 that the requested testing may produce
exculpatory or mitigating evidence related to conviction or sentencing. 57
The order must contain a description of the evidence to be tested, the
laboratory where testing will be performed58 , and the method of testing to
be utilized. 59 The location of testing is especially likely to be litigated, as
the cost of testing varies considerably among crime labs. 60 The order
must also address the payment for the cost oftesting. 61
The method of testing selected by the court must be generally accepted
within the scientific community.62 The two most prevalent types of DNA
RFLP
testing 63
analyses used ill the scientific setting,
MD. R. 4-710(a)(I)(B).
Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664, 683, 985 A.2d 32, 43 (2009). Reasonable
probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undennine confidence in the outcome [of
a trial]." Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 347, 768 A.2d 675,682 (2001) (citing U.S. v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667,682 (1985».
57
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(1); MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(A).
58
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f); MD. R. 4-7\O(a)(2)(B)(i). If the parties cannot agree where
the DNA testing will be done, the court may designate testing at any laboratory accredited by
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, the Laboratory Accreditation Board, or
the National Forensic Science Technology Center. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(t)(4); MD. R. 471O(a)(2)(B)(i)(c).
59
Compare CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(t), with MD. R. 4-710(a)(2)(B)(i)(a)-(c). There is an
apparent discrepancy between the Maryland Criminal Procedure article and the Maryland
Rules as to whether these provisions in the court's order for testing are mandatory or
discretionary. A court in all practicality should be required to order these provisions as they
are the sort of nuances the State and the petitioner may quibble over.
60
OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COST STUDY OF DNA TESTING AND
ANALYSIS, 8 (2006), available at http://www.osbm.state.nc.uS/files/pdCfiles/3-1-2006Final
DNAReport.pdf. At a public crime lab, the test can cost anywhere from $350 to $1,800. ld. at
8. The North Carolina study found that DNA analysis at private crime labs cost anywhere
from $445 to $1,200, but that costs only includes laboratory work. ld. at 7. Costs for expert
testimony can be up to $2,000 per day plus travel expenses. Jd.
61
Compare CRlM. PROC. § 8-201(h) (stating that the petitioner must initially pay for the
testing and if the results are favorable to the petitioner, the court must order the State to pay
for the cost of testing), with MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(B)(i)(e) (only requiring that the order for
testing contain a provision concerning payment for testing and could be interpreted to mean
that a judge may order the state to pay the initial cost of testing).
62
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2); Md. R. 4-710(a)(I)(b).
63
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Testing works by isolating DNA from
biological samples and cutting them into smaller fragments using a restriction enzyme.
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 26-27. The smaller fragments are then organized
by length where discrete locations of the human genome are then visualized as bands on film.
Jd. at 27. This test was developed in 1994 and has been used in many exonerations but
55

56
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and PCR testing 64, have been accepted by the courts. The court, in its
discretion, may order the preservation of a sample of material for further
testing and analysis at a later date. 65 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has also held that a hearing court lacks the power to order exclusion of
the same samples from further testing. 66 The court may also order the
release of biological evidence held by a third party. 67 Finally, the court
may make any other order it deems appropriate. 68
D. Review After Testing

After testing is completed, if the result of the DNA test or database
search is unfavorable to the petitioner, namely, "if the test results fail to
produce eXCUlpatory or mitigating evidence [regarding] wrongful
conviction or sentencing," the petition is dismissed. 69 However, if the
test results are favorable to the petitioner70 , the court may order the
opening or reopening of a postconviction proceeding. 7 I It is important to
note that the Court of Appeals has held that a petitioner cannot lose the
requires a minimum of 100,000 cells that are not degraded and thus many small samples will
not be suitable for RFLP testing. ld. at 26-27.
64
Nuclear Polymerase Chain Reaction Testing works by utilizing an enzyme to amplify,
or copy, specific regions ofa DNA sample from within a cell's nucleus. ld. at 27. While this
test has been used in criminal matters, it is not as discriminating as other forms of testing. See
DNA Fingerprinting Methods, http://www.fingerprinting.comldna-fingerprinting-methods.php
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). PCR testing can also be used to draw a DNA profile from a cell's
mitochondria. FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 28. Mitochondrial testing is most
often used when there is a very small sample to be analyzed, such as dried bones or teeth, or
when the sample is too degraded for Nuclear PCR testing. Id.
65
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f)(3); MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(B)(ii)(b); Thompson v. State 395 Md.
240, 909 A.2d 1035 (2006). The court does need to first find that there is sufficient DNA
material to preserve due to the possibility that there will only be enough genetic material for a
single test ld. at 250-51,909 A.2d at 1042. Provisions guaranteeing that enough samples are
preserved for possible future testing are important as the advancement of science may make
testing possible in the future using a new testing technique or mechanism which was not
available at the time the petition was filed.
66
Thompson, 395 Md. at 259,909 A.2d at 1047.
67
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f)(5); MD. R. 4-710(a)(2)(B)(ii)(a). Scientific evidence may not
always be in the custody of the state. It is certainly possible that evidence may be located, for
example, in a hospital or medical facility or even with the victim or victim's family.
Compelling the release of such potential evidence may be difficult without obtaining a court
order. See Horton v. State, 412 Md. I, 10,985 A.2d 540,545 (hospital refused, citing patient
confidentiality, to release slide of pap smear taken from rape victim).
68
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f); MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(B)(ii)(c); Horton, 412 Md. at 4,985 A.2d
at 542.
69
MD. R. 4-711(a); accord CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (i)(I).
70
The standard of "favorable to petitioner" logically includes any test result in which the
DNA subject to testing does not conclusively match the DNA profile of the petitioner.
71
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(2)(i)-(ii); MD. R. 4-711(b)(I)(A)-(C). The petitioner being
granted a postconviction hearing would most likely then challenge that the conviction is
subject to collateral attack on grounds traditionally available under a writ of habeas corpus.
CRIM.PROC. §§ 7-102(a)(4), 7-102(b).
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right to argue DNA testing by failing to raise it as an issue in another
postconviction proceeding.72 In the event that the results of the DNA
testing show a substantial possibility that the petitioner would not have
been convicted if the DNA results were revealed to the trier of fact, the
court may order a new trial in lieu of a postconviction proceeding. 73 The
hearing court may also order a new trial when a substantial possibility of
innocence based on the testing does not result, but, instead, a new trial is
warranted in the interests of justice. 74 If the court elects to grant the
petitioner a new trial, the court in its discretion may order release of the
petitioner from incarceration prior to trial. 75 The release may be
conditioned on bond or other conditions that reasonably assure the
appearance of the petitioner at trial. 76

E. Preserving Scientific Evidence
Apart from the provisions regarding the process for testing scientific
evidence, Maryland's statute also requires the preservation of scientific
evidence that the State has reason to know contains genetic material and
is kept in connection with an offense for which a petitioner can seek relief
under this statute. 77 Such evidence must be kept during the time for
which an inmate is sentenced. 78 The length of sentence also includes
consecutive sentences imposed for other offenses for which the defendant
was found guilty. 79 If the State is unable to produce items for testing
upon request, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the
destruction of the evidence was willful or intentional. 80 If the court
determines that the failure to produce the evidence for testing was the
Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524,545,983 A.2d 1071, 1082 (2009).
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(2)(iii); MD. R. 4-71 1(b)(l)(D); Arrington, 411 Md. at 552, 555
983 A.2d at 1087, 1089 (petitioner awarded a new trial where state argued victim's blood was
on petitioner's pants after a stabbing-a fact later proved to be false).
74
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(3); MD. R. 4-71 1(b)(2).
75
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(4); MD. R. 4-71 1(b)(3).
76
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (i)(4); MD. R. 4-71 1(b)(3).
77
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201U)(l); Horton v. State, 412 Md. 1,5,985 A.2d 540, 542 (2009).
The offenses for which petitioner may seek relief are limited to murder, manslaughter, and
various sex offenses. See supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text. Many other states have
similar provisions that require states to retain evidence that has scientific value. E.g., ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4221 (West Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11(4) (West Supp.
2009); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN § 770.l6(c)(12) (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2953.81(A) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1372 (West 2003). These sorts of
provisions will not be discussed in depth here because this paper focuses on substance and
procedures of postconviction DNA testing provisions. Statutes regarding the retention of
biological evidence will be discussed to the extent they are relevant to this topic.
78
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(j)(2) (West 2010).
79
Id.
80
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (j)(3)(i). The court is only required to hold a hearing as to the
existence of such evidence when there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether or not the
evidence still exists. Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 507, 929 A.2d 501, 510 (2007).
72

73
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result of intentional and willful destruction, the court must order a
postconviction hearing and the postconviction court must infer that the
results of the test would have been favorable to petitioner. 81
If the State wishes to dispose of evidence holding potential scientific
value prior to the expiration of the time period it is required to be kept,
they must notify the individual incarcerated, his or her attorney of record,
and the Office of the Public Defender. 82 The notice must include a
description of the evidence, the intentions of the State to dispose of the
evidence, unless an objection is filed in writing, and the name and
location of the circuit court where an objection may be filed. 83 The
individual has 120 days from the date of service to file an objection to
destruction of the evidence in the appropriate circuit court. 84 The State
may subsequently dispose of the evidence if no objection is filed. 85 If an
objection is timely filed, the court must hold a hearing on whether or not
the evidence may be destroyed. 86 The court may order the destruction of
the evidence if it determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
evidence lacks any significant forensic value 87 or that the evidence cannot
be practically retained by a law enforcement agency due to a physical
characteristic. 88 If destruction is requested due to a physical characteristic
of the evidence, the court must order that the party opposing destruction
be given an opportunity to obtain samples of the evidence prior to its
destruction. 89 The samples of evidence must be collected by a qualified
crime scene technician. 90 Further, an aggrieved party may appeal an
order made pursuant to section 8-201 to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. 91

81
CRIM. PRoe. § 8-201(j)(3)(ii). When a postconviction hearing is granted in this
instance, the petitioner would likely need to establish that the judgment violated either the
Federal or Maryland Constitution or that the sentence is subject to collateral attack. See CRIM.
PROC. § 7-102(a)(I), (a)(4).
82
§ 8-201(k)(I); Horton, 412 Md. at 5, 985 A.2d at 542.
83
CRIM. PRoe. § 8-201(k)(2).
84

ld.

CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(3).
CRIM. PROe. § 8-201(k)(4).
87
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(4)(i).
88
CRIM. PRoe. § 8-201(k)(4)(ii). Characteristics of size and bulk are enumerated in the
statute, but these would not presumably be the only properties of evidence that could fit this
portion of the statute. The probability of evidence needed to be discarded under this portion
of the statute is not likely to apply as DNA evidence will most likely be found on relatively
small tangible items.
85

86

89

ld.

90

CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(5).
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(6).

91
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F. Retroactive Application
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated that amendments to
section 8-201 are to be applied retroactively.92 Maryland courts are not
bound by language contained in previous versions of section 8-201 once
new language becomes effective, despite the fact that the appeal may
have been filed at the time when previous language was in effect. 93 Such
retrospective application of a statute is an exception to the general rule
that most new statutes are strictly applied prospectively and the Court of
Appeals of Maryland listed several reasons for applying the
Postconviction DNA Relief statute in such a way.94 First, the statute is
merely a procedural change rather than the alteration of a substantive
right. 95 Second, the legislature intended the statute to have a remedial
effect for persons who are wrongfully convicted. 96 New laws applying to
procedural changes do not carry a presumption of operating
prospectively, and the statute is designed to remedy past cases of injustice
where a person was convicted of a crime they did not commit. 97
Consider a situation where Jeffrey was convicted for the murder of
Kimberly and wishes to utilize section 8-201 twenty-five years later in an
attempt to prove his actual innocence. Without an allowance in cases like
Jeffrey's, an entire class of convicts 98 would not be able to benefit from
the new law, despite the fact that they are the group that has the most to
Because these petitioners were convicted before the
gain. 99
postconviction DNA statute became effective, and before DNA testing
and other forensic technologies became widely used, such convictions,
from the outset, are the ones that are the most suspect.
III. POSTCONVICTION DNA RELIEF IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have statutes allowing a petitioner to make a motion for
DNA testing of biological evidence.lOo Both substantive and procedural

92
Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664,667,985 A.2d 32, 33-34 (2009); Gregg v. State, 409
Md. 698, 714-15, 976 A.2d 999,1008-09 (2009).
93
Gregg, 409 Md. at 714-18, 967 A.2d at 1008-10.
94
ld. at 714-15, 976 A.2d at 1008-09.
95
ld. at 715, 976 A.2d at 1008.
96
Jd. at 715, 976 A.2d at 1008-09.
97
Jd.
98
The class of convicts refers to those incarcerated prior to the enactment of the
postconviction DNA testing statute.
99
Consider this class of inmates referenced in the text to those who were convicted prior
to the widespread use of DNA evidence in the courtroom.
100
The only two states which do not have post-conviction DNA relief statutes are
Massachusetts and Oklahoma. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
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rules for obtaining relief through postconviction DNA testing vary
significantly by jurisdiction.
State rules have increased in their
importance to those seeking relief, as the Supreme Court has made it
clear that it does not intend to create any constitutional right to
postconviction DNA testing. 101 Therefore, the various procedural and
substantive rules enumerated in postconviction DNA relief statutes have
become imperative, as federal courts will not intervene by overruling
decisions made by state courts of last resort. 102 It is the policy of the
federal courts, except in the case of a "truly persuasive demonstration of
actual innocence," to not grant any form of federal habeas corpus relief
and respect the state court judgment. 103
A. Standard to Obtain Court Ordered DNA Testing

There exist a number of slightly varying standards specifically
outlining what a petitioner must allege the results of testing will show.
These standards can generally be categorized into two groups. The first
group requires that a test result favorable to the petitioner show a
reasonable probability of a different trial verdict. 104 The second group
requires that the petitioner allege that a favorable test result would be
materially relevant to a claim of actual innocence or, worded
alternatively, a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. 105 Still others
require that the petitioner allege DNA testing will prove their innocence
beyond all doubt. 106
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ContentiAccess_To_ PostConviction_DNA_ Testing.php
(last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
101
See Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322, 2316 (2009) (resting on
the conclusion that there is no substantive due process right to obtain access to State's
evidence for testing). However, the Court made it clear that creating a due process right in the
area of postconviction DNA testing would be unwise because it would essentially preclude
state legislatures from creating their own rules in this developing area of criminal procedure.
Id. at 2322.
102
See id.
103
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554 (2006) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
417 (1993) (internal quotations omitted».
104 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(c)(l) (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §
81.l0(7)(e) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(b) (2007). Maryland has also adopted
this standard. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (West 2009); see also supra note
26 and accompanying text.
105 E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(6)(B) (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16I 12-202(6)(B) (2006); COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413(a) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
II, § 4504(a)(5) (West 2007); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 51116-3(c)(1) (West 2008) (stating
that there is no requirement to allege that testing would completely exonerate petitioner);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01(la)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
106
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(8)(B) (2006): COL. REv STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413(1)(a)
(West 2004) (stating that a court shall not order relief DNA testing unless petitioner shows by
a preponderance of the evidence that favorable test results will demonstrate actual
innocence)( emphasis added).
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B. Standards of What DNA Testing Results Must Yield to For Petitioners
to be Entitled to Relief
Jurisdictions vary widely on what DNA test results must show so that
a petitioner can be granted relief. At the very minimum, the results must
show enough doubt as to the validity of a conviction to warrant further
inquiry. Many jurisdictions require that, in light of the testing, it is
"reasonably probable" that the petitioner would not have been convicted
if such DNA test results were available at trial. 107 One rule mandates that
when the results are favorable to the petitioner the court may take any
action it deems to be appropriate under the circumstances, including
sending the case to postconviction, granting a new trial, or even vacating
the judgment of conviction and releasing the petitioner. 108 Another rule
states that, in a hearing after testing is completed, a court may order any
appropriate relief if the petitioner appears to be innocent in light of all of
evidence available. 109 In some jurisdictions, the petitioner must show
compelling evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal. 110

C. Application of Statute to Different Crimes
Jurisdictions vary considerably as to the crime or crimes a petitioner
must have been convicted of in order to be eligible for postconviction
DNA relief. At one end of the spectrum, two states allow for DNA
testing only in death penalty cases. IliOn the other end, many
jurisdictions allow a petitioner to request DNA testing after being
convicted of any felony. I 12 Generally, most jurisdictions place no

E.g., Tx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 64.04 (West 2006).
E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3S-38-7-1 (LexisNexis supp. 2008); see also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-2S12(f)(2)(B) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § ISA-270(c) (2007).
109
DEL. CODE ANN. tit., II § 4S04(b) (West 2007). Due to the difficulty of proving a
negative, namely, that a petitioner did not commit the crime for which he was convicted, a
clear and convincing showing of innocence is likely lowest possible standard of proof
acceptable to serve justice to those wrongly convicted and serve the interest of the state in
keeping those who are guilty in prison. However, the Delaware standard defeats its own
purpose because it first requires that a petitioner demonstrate that no trier of fact could find
them guilty, and then sends the case to be decided by a new trier of fact.
110
18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(g)(2) (West Supp. 2010); People v. Starks, 8S0 N.E.2d 206, 212
(Ill. App. 2006) (evidence must be so conclusive that it would probably change the result of
the trial).
III
The two states allowing for postconviction DNA testing only in death penalty cases
are Kentucky and Nevada. Ky. REv. STAT. Al\'N. § 422.285 (West Supp. 2008); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 176.0918-.0919 (LexisNexis 2009).
112
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 140S (West Supp. 2009); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11
(West Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-S-41(c) (West 2011) (stating that relief is limited to
serious violent felonies as defined in § 17-10-6.1); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.\0(1) (West 2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29S3.72(C)(I)(a) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-301 (West
2008).
107
108
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significant limitation on the type of crime for which the petitioner must
have been found guilty. 113
D. Right to Counsel

A minority of jurisdictions provide a compulsory right to counsel. 114
In most jurisdictions the right to counsel provision is triggered upon some
preliminary showing by the petitioner of entitlement to relief. 115 At this
time, the Maryland Rules require an appointment of counsel to the
petitioner if the petitioner is indigent and if the motion is not denied as a
matter of law. 116 It appears that the appointment of counsel provision
may have been written in reaction to the cases where a petitioner stood a
chance of success, but genuinely required the assistance of counsel to
further aid the petitioning and hearing process. I 17
E. Testing Must Not Have Been Available To the Petitioner Prior to
Conviction

Many jurisdictions require that the ability to test DNA evidence be
contingent upon the availability to test during the time prior to conviction,
and the failure on the part of the petitioner to utilize such testing, without
compelling justification, constitutes a waiver of the right to make a
postconviction challenge for potentially exculpatory DNA testing. 118

113
See, e.g., 18 V.S.c.A. § 3600(a) (West Supp. 2010) (crimes of imprisonment or death);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 (2006); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413 (West 2004); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(a) (West 2009) (addressing crimes of incarceration); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. II, § 4504 (2007); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2008); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 590.01 (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (West 2007); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (West 2006). While these jurisdictions may theoretically allow
for testing after conviction for any crime, convictions for less serious crimes are far less likely
to get to the point where postconviction DNA testing becomes an issue because: (I) DNA
evidence simply will not be collected given the circumstances of the crime; (2) the existence
or nonexistence of forensic evidence is not relevant to the investigation; and (3) the petitioner
would be released from custody before any potential DNA testing would be completed
making any petition for DNA testing a moot point, assuming the statute requires incarceration
as a requirement to file a petition.
114
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10(11) (West 2009) (stating that counsel be appointed
upon filing the motion for relief when petitioner claims he or she is indigent).
115
E.g., COL. REV. STAT. Ann. § 18-1-412(2)-(4) (West 2004) (stating that counsel be
appointed by court upon a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief if defendant is
indigent); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(e) (West 2009) (counsel appointed by
court if indigent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (West 2007) (stating that there be a counsel
appointment by court upon a showing that DNA testing may be material to relief and
indigence); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(c) (West 2006) (stating that counsel be
appointed upon finding of reasonable grounds for motion to be filed and indigence).
116
See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
117
See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
118
E.g., 18 V.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(3)(A) (West. Supp. 2010); see also COL. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1-413(1)(C)(Il) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a)(2) (West 2007); 725 ILL.
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Other jurisdictions only require that the DNA itself, while possibly
available for testing, was, for whatever reason, not tested. I 19 Provisions
such as these prevent the petitioner from strategically not having relevant
biological evidence tested, and subsequently claiming they have the right
to test such evidence in an attempt to develop facts that could have been
available at trial. Additionally, statutes in several jurisdictions allow for
further DNA testing to be performed only upon a showing that the
availability of newer technology has a substantial likelihood of being
more probative than the methods used in previous tests. 120 Allowing
petitioners to file subsequent motions for DNA testing satisfies the
purpose underlying Maryland Code section 8-201 by not restricting a
petitioner to a single petition in the hope that science has advanced far
enough to potentially provide relief. Supplementary testing might be
done if a new method of DNA testing is accepted by the courts, or if the
petitioner can demonstrate that, for whatever reason, the results of prior
tests can be shown to have been unreliable.
F. Identity Issue Must Have Been Raised In Prior Proceedings

Several jurisdictions require that the identity of the perpetrator be
disputed at some point in the prior proceedings. 121 While the rule may
initially appear idiosyncratic, its purpose is to keep petitioners from
generating new factual issues as a bridge to possible avenues of relief that
were not previously argued. Such a requirement prevents a situation
where a petitioner argued an affirmative defense such as consent or selfdefense. Admitting involvement in the act, but merely denying that a
crime was committed, makes DNA testing a moot point.
G. Time Limitations for Filing Petition

A minority of jurisdictions also impose a time limitation, typically two
to three years, for a petitioner to file a motion for postconviction DNA
testing. 122 The majority rule, however, is to impose no time restraint in
COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/l16-3(a)(I) (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.0I(la)(2) (West Supp.
2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(b)(l)(a)(i) (West 2006).
119
E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-200(c)(2)(West 2011).
120
E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(3)(8) (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16112-202(10)(8)(iii) (2006); 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 I 6-3 (a)(2) (West 2008); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 590.0I(la)(2) (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)(3)(8) (West
2007).
121
18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(7) (West Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112202(10)(8)(iii) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a)(3) (West 2007); 725 ILL. COMPo
STAT. ANN. 5/116-3(b)(1) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.1O(7)(c) (West 2009); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 590.01(la)(b)(l) (West Supp. 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
64.03(a)(l)(8) (West 2006).
122
18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(lO)(A) (West Supp. 2010) (stating that a motion may be
brought at any time within five years of enactment of the Justice for All Act or within three
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any form on a petition for testing of DNA evidence. I23 There is currently
no requirement in Maryland that the petition be filed within any particular
amount of time. 124
H. Requirement of a Chain of Custody

Nearly all jurisdictions require that any biological evidence to be
tested have a proper chain of custody sufficient to ensure that it was not
tampered with or materially altered. 125 The purpose is to ensure the
reliability of evidence. 126 The reason for requiring a sufficient chain of
custody in a postconviction DNA petition is essentially the same.
Without a minimal showing that the evidence now being subjected to
DNA testing is reliable, petitioners may skirt the system when they
demand testing after evidence was somehow tampered with 127, a potential
problem that a proper chain of custody is designed to combat. 128

years of conviction); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(1O)(A) (2006) (stating that there is
rebuttable presumption of timeliness within 36 months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a)
(West 2007) (motion must be filed within three years "after the judgment of conviction is
final"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2008) (stating that a motion must be filed
within two years of conviction or within two years of the discovery of new technology);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01(4)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (stating that a motion must be filed
within two years unless evidence could not have reasonably been discovered within the
required timeframe).
123
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1-412 to 413 (West 2004); see also 725 ILL. COMPo
STAT. ANN. 5/II6-3 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2009); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009) (no limitation listed); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
64.01-64.05 (West 2006).
124
See generally MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009). Because DNA
evidence has the capability of proving innocence decades after a crime occurred, there is no
compelling reason to deny testing merely because a long time has passed. However, given the
current climate in the criminal justice system where forensic evidence can be a crucial part of
a case, the number of cases where the possibility that new DNA evidence will be uncovered
that may establish innocence will certainly diminish in the years to come as both prosecutors
and defense attorneys will try to seek out this evidence that could prove dispositive of guilt or
innocence in several instances. The Court of Appeals has also rejected a laches argument
presented by the state. Gregg V. State, 409 Md. 698, 716-17, 976 A.2d 999, 1009 (2009).
125
E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600 (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112202(4) (West 2006) (requiring that the evidence remain in the possession of the State with
proper chain of custody); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a)(4) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-4902(c)(I) (West 2004); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/116-3(b)(2) (West 2008)
(requiring a prima facie proof of no tampering); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10(7)(b) (West 2009);
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 2l38(4)(8) (West 2008) (requiring prima facie evidence of sufficient
chain of custody); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01(lb)(2) (West Supp. 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(I)(A)(ii) (West 2006). Maryland's statute does not have any chain
of custody requirement. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009).
126
Thompson V. State, 80 Md. App. 676, 683, 566 A.2d 126, l30 (2010).
127
7 A MD LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINAL LAW, § l38 (Robert F. Koets et al. eds., 2000).
128
Jd.
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1. Challenging a Conviction Based on a Plea Agreement

Jurisdictions are sharply divided over whether petitioners who pled
guilty still retain the privilege to make postconviction motions for DNA
testing. 129 Several jurisdictions explicitly allow, via statute or case law, a
petitioner who pled guilty to make a motion for relief. 130 A minority of
jurisdictions do not permit a court to grant a motion for DNA testing if
the conviction stemmed from a guilty plea. 13l
Courts in most
jurisdictions still have not had an opportunity to decide whether a guilty
plea bars a petitioner from seeking relief. 132
J Miscellaneous Provisions

Two other rules utilized in a few jurisdictions are worth discussion.
At least one state and the federal government require that the theory or
theories of innocence enumerated in a petitioner's motion cannot be
inconsistent with a defense presented at trial. 133 Three jurisdictions,
including the federal government, also require that the petitioner sign an
affidavit of actual innocence. 134 A few jurisdictions require that the
petitioner still be incarcerated to apply for relief. 135
IV.

WEAKNESSES IN MARYLAND'S STATUTE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
CHANGE

The extraordinary feature of DNA is that it can exonerate individuals
who were wrongfully convicted. 136 With that in mind, the end result of
129
See JH Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of PostConviction DNA Testingfor Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F.L. REv. 47, 50-51 n.

18-20 (2010) (discussing the merits of allowing offenders to challenge, through
postconviction DNA testing, convictions to which they pled guilty).
130
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(e) (West 2009); see also D.C. CODE § 22-4133(b)(4)
(2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 844D-123(a)(l) (West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 194202(d) (West 2004); Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.035 (West 2002) (as interpreted in Weeks v.
State, 140 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Mo. 2004)); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(b) (West
2006) (stating that identity must be an issue).
131
E.g., 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. § 51116-3 (West 2008) (as interpreted in People v.
O'Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315,319 (Ill. 2007)); see also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2953.72(C)(2)
(West 2010).
132
See 18 U.S.c.A. § 3600 (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-413 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504
(West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2009).
I33
18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(6)(A) (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16 112202(6)(A) (West 2006) (excluding instances where the petitioner put forth an affirmative
defense at trial).
134
18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(I) (West Supp. 2010); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A269(b)(3) (2007); TEX. CODE CRlM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.0 1(a) (West 2006).
135
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-412(a) (West 2004); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §
54-102kk(a) (West 2009).
136
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 2.
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Maryland's statute should be limited to freeing individuals who are in
prison for crimes they can prove to a virtual certainty they did not
commit. 137 The key goals the legislature should strive to reach are: (1)
freeing inmates who were wrongfully convicted after a trial as quickly
and efficiently as possible; (2) eliminating instances where a factually
guilty inmate could be released from incarceration; and (3) providing
greater access to DNA evidence and greater scrutiny of cases that appear
to be meritorious. Petitions should not be granted in instances where
innocence is possible, but ultimately incapable of being proven to any
sort of substantial certainty.
A. The Standard Should be Changed Regarding what the Petitioner Must
Allege DNA Testing Will Show
Maryland's statute currently states that a court shall order testing if a
petitioner can establish a reasonable probability that such testing will
produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to wrongful
conviction or sentencing. 138 The statute currently allows for review upon
an allegation that testing has the potential to reveal "exculpatory or
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or
sentencing.,,139 Such a standard should be changed to reflect what DNA
testing is capable of, namely, establishing identity, and only permit a
court to order review upon an allegation that testing will reveal
exculpatory evidence relating only to a wrongful conviction.
The value of DNA evidence lies in its power to identify individuals in
ways that other forms of evidence cannot. The possibility of DNA
evidence uncovering and eventually proving facts sufficient to mitigate
an improper sentence is simply too unlikely to be allowed. Essentially,
what a petitioner would be trying to accomplish is speculation of facts
that are almost impossible to prove through DNA testing, and are only
properly raised and argued at trial. Furthermore, prior to any motion for
review of DNA evidence, petitioners have multiple opportunities to argue
that any sentence they received was excessive or unconstitutional. A
petitioner may take advantage of making the proper sentencing arguments
137
Notwithstanding the difficulty of proving a negative, after a trial in which the
petitioner was convicted, the burden of proof must necessarily shift from the State to the
petitioner to prove a miscarriage of justice occurred. The high burden of proving one's
innocence shifts as the State has already fulfilled their burden of proving the petitioner guilty
beyond all reasonable doubt. Having them prove the petitioner's guilt again, simply because
some doubt has arisen, is patently inequitable.
138
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (d)(l)(i) (West 2009).
139 ld. There also appears to be an internal discrepancy within section 8-201. Compare
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b)(1) (where a petition may only be filed to challenge a judgment of
conviction), with § 8-201 (d) (where DNA testing may be ordered if a court finds the scientific
potential exists to correct an error in conviction or sentencing).
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during the sentencing phase of the trial,140 sentence review by a panel of
circuit court judges, 141 by filing a motion for modification or reduction of
sentence,142 through the direct appeal process,143 and during other
postconviction proceedings. 144
Accordingly, the statute should be reworded to eliminate any
possibility that DNA testing could be ordered for the sole reason of
mitigating a sentence. A petitioner's recourse for an incorrect sentence,
in the postconviction DNA testing context, should be limited to the event
of a grant of a motion for DNA testing and the establishment of actual
innocence by a test, thus rendering moot any possibility that a sentence
was Improper.
B. The Standard Should be Changed for What the Result ofDNA Testing
Must Show for a Petitioner to be Awarded Relief
As the statute is written, a petitioner is entitled to relief if the results of
the DNA test ordered by a court are "favorable to the petitioner.,,145 The
end result of any DNA relief statute should be only to release petitioners
who are able to meet the high burden of substantially establishing actual
innocence. Section 8-201 petitions should not be available to inmates
who are only able to establish a mere possibility that they are not guilty of
the crime for which a jury convicted them. If the testing ordered by the
court is inconclusive, while "favorable" to the petitioner, there should be
no remedy available. There should also be no remedy available in
situations where DNA testing shows that the petitioner is "probably"
innocent. Once the veil of the presumption of innocence dissipates,
petitioners attempting to prove they were wrongfully convicted should be
compelled to show that a reasonable person would not only see that they
~~~~~~a~oo~~oo~~~~~~

convinced of factual innocence.
In light of this proposed standard, new trials should not be granted. It
is also difficult to see what real purpose a postconviction hearing serves
when DNA evidence shows that a man in prison did not commit the

140
See Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 683, 664 A.2d 903, 907 (1995) (stating that trial
courts have nearly unfettered discretion in the information they may consider in reaching the
proper sentence); Smith v. State, 308 Md. 162, 167,517 A.2d 1081, 1084 (1986) (stating that
a defendant's sentence should fit the offender and not merely the crime).
141
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-102 (West 2009) (stating that the defendant must be
sentenced by a circuit court to two or more years in prison).
142
MD. R. 4-345(e).
143
MD. R. 8-201; MD. R. 8-202.
144
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102(a)(I) (West 2011). The defendant would most
likely make an allegation that their sentence violates the Constitution of the United States or
the Constitution or laws of the State of Maryland.
145
See CRIM. PROC. § 8-20 1(i)(2).
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crime for which he was convicted. All that should be necessary is a
single streamlined process where a judge first determines if DNA testing
is warranted, and then another hearing by the same judge to determine if
testing shows that the petitioner is factually innocent, a determination
from which either party involved may appeal. Of course, a petitioner
should be left free to file another motion under section 8-201 if future
technological advancements may yield more conclusive results.
Any standard for entitlement to relief will have its shortcomings when
viewed in terms of who it does and does not benefit. However, at the
postconviction stage, the presumption of innocence does not exist. 146 The
postconviction DNA petition should not be pennitted for anything other
than substantially proving one's actual innocence. While it is an
unfortunate fact that innocent people are in prison for crimes they did not
commit, if those petitioners are not able to prove their innocence, and are
only able to show their probable innocence, they should be forced to find
another avenue for relief.
C. The Statute Should Be Expanded to Include Relieffor More Crimes
While the number of successful section 8-201 petitions for crimes
other than homicide and rape will likely only amount to a minimal
percentage of exonerations, the option should be available to those
petitioners who are serving lengthy prison sentences for crimes they may
not be guilty of committing. In many cases, this may be the last option
for a factually innocent petitioner looking for relief if their case has
slipped through the cracks at the trial and appellate levels. Where there
exists the possibility that a petitioner could prove their innocence,
postconviction DNA testing should be allowed so long as testing would
be probative to proving one's innocence.
Maryland currently only affords the possibility of relief to petitioners
who are convicted of various degrees of murder, manslaughter, or sex
offenses. 147 Conversely, while petitioners are only entitled to relief for
those few enumerated crimes, Maryland prosecutors are not bound in any
way from using DNA evidence at trial no matter what crime or crimes for
which the defendant has been charged. 148 In theory, a Maryland
prosecutor could obtain a conviction for burglary where DNA evidence
was used to establish that the defendant was inside the home, but the
146
See He"era, 506 U.S. at 399 (holding that the presumption of innocence disappears if
the defendant has been convicted after a fair trial); see also Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298,
317 (2002) (holding that after a defendant is found guilty by a jury he no longer enjoys a
presumption of innocence).
147
See supra Part Il.A, notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
148
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915(c) (West 2009) (stating that DNA
evidence is admissible in any criminal proceeding).
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defendant could not later come back and file a petition for postconviction
DNA testing to argue that a newer form of DNA testing will show that
the first test was mistaken. This is an inherent and fundamental flaw in
Maryland's postconviction DNA statute that is wholly inequitable to the
end goal of serving justice.
Maryland should strongly consider entertaining petitions for DNA
testing upon conviction for more felonies and crimes punishable by at
least one year in prison. Whiie some states offer the possibility of relief
for any felony l49, Maryland should expand the statute by specifically
enumerating more offenses for which review may prove someone's
innocence, the rationale being that there are several types of crimes for
which DNA evidence will not be analyzed. For example, there is simply
no reason to entertain petitions for convictions of various types of
fraud l50 , crimes against public administration 151 , and gaming
violations. 152 For such crimes, the probability of DNA evidence even
being collected and/or being material justifies them not being included in
the statute. 153 It may be wise, however, for the Maryland Legislature to
include a provision, in section 8-201(b), where a judge may entertain a
postconviction DNA petition for a crime not included in the list upon a
special finding that DNA testing may prove to be exculpatory.
The Maryland Legislature should strongly consider expanding the
Postconviction DNA Relief statute to include possible relief for crimes
not originally included. Most crimes against persons including attempted

See supra Part III.B, note 112 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 8-103 to 108 (West 2009) (referencing bad check
crimes); see also CRIM. LAW §§ 8-203 to 210 (referencing credit card crimes); CRIM. LAW §§
8-301 to 305 (referencing identity theft crimes); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-401 to 408 (referencing other
forms of commercial fraud); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-503 to 505 (referencing public assistance
frauds); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-509 to 515 (referencing Medicaid frauds); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-520 to
523 (referencing other public frauds); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-601 to 613 (referencing counterfeiting
and related crimes); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-701 to 702 (referencing crimes against estates); CRIM.
LAW § 8-801 (referencing financial crimes against vulnerable adults); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-901 to
905 (referencing miscellaneous frauds).
151
See CRIM. LAW §§ 9-101 to 102 (regarding perjury); see also CRIM. LAW §§ 9-201 to
205 (regarding bribery); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-302 to 306 (regarding obstruction of justice); CRIM.
LAW §§ 9-402 to 408 (regarding harboring and escape); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-412 to 417
(regarding contraband in places of confinement); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-504 to 506 (regarding false
statements); CRIM. LAW § 9-604 (regarding false alarm); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-702, 9-703
(regarding sabotage); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-802 to 805 (regarding criminal gang offenses).
152
SeeCRIM. LAW §§ 12-103,12-105,12-109 (regarding various gaming violations).
153
The elements required to prove these crimes make DNA evidence simply not relevant.
In the event that such DNA evidence was collected, any exculpatory value it might have
would, in a best-case scenario, be so tenuous as to not justify relief.
149
150
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murder 154, assault 155 , various sex offenses 156, robbery 157, kidnapping 158,
and abuse,159 should be included because: (1) these crimes are more likely
than others to be investigated promptly and thoroughly; and (2) forensic
evidence could be easily used to tie the offender to the particular victim
or to the scene of the crime.
One potential argument against inclusion of these crimes is the interest
of judicial economy, as many petitions filed for these "lesser" crimes will
simply not have relevant forensic evidence to examine, due either to the
facts of the case or because DNA and other forms of forensic evidence
were not gathered for testing. Allowing such petitions could clog the
court system to the detriment of other more meritorious petitions. The
end result is patently unfair to petitioners who are wrongfully imprisoned,
as they should have at their disposal all reasonable means to challenge the
validity of their conviction.
A situation may also arise where DNA evidence related to a crime of
violence, for whatever reason, was not collected, potentially because: (1)
police and prosecutors were certain they had enough evidence to convict
their suspect; or (2) investigators knew of the chance that any possible
DNA analysis may be exculpatory.160 Unfortunately, a petitioner filing a
postconviction DNA motion will not have any success under these
circumstances. One way to prevent this kind of potential abuse would be
to permit a defendant, at trial, to argue that the police had the opportunity
to collect and analyze biological evidence at a crime scene that may have
indicated that the defendant did not commit the crime. The jury should
then be permitted to infer that such evidence would have been
eXCUlpatory. Such an argument could be permitted whether agents of the
State deliberately chose not to collect scientific evidence for analysis or if
such an error was merely an oversight. Even in the latter scenario, the
defendant on trial is still potentially deprived of an opportunity to present
an alternate theory ofthe crime.
See CRIM. LAW §§ 2-205, 2-206.
See CRIM. LAW §§ 3-202 to 204 (regarding assault in the first and second degree, and
reckless endangennent) and § 3-210 (regarding assault by inmate).
156
See CRIM. LAW § 3-307 (regarding sexual offense in the third degree); see also CRIM.
LAW §§ 3-309 to 312 (regarding attempted rape and attempted sexual offense); CRlM. LAW §
3-314 (regarding sexual conduct between correctional officer and inmate); CRIM. LAW § 3-315
(regarding continuing course of conduct with child); CRIM. LAW § 3-321 (regarding sodomy).
157
CRIM. LAW §§ 3-402, 3-403,3-405 (regarding carjacking).
158
CRIM. LAW §§ 3-502, 3-503 (regarding kidnapping and child kidnapping).
159
CRlM. LAW § 3-601 (regarding child abuse); see also CRIM. LAW § 3-602 (regarding the
sexual abuse of a minor); CRIM. LAW §§ 3-604, 3-605 (regarding the abuse of vulnerable
adults).
160
Consider convictions based solely on, or through a combination of, eyewitness
testimony, other fonns of physical evidence, and video or audio recordings that do not
conclusively identify the defendant.
154
155
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D. A Right to Counsel Upon an Initial Showing ofEntitlement to Relief
Should be Guaranteed

One compelling reason to allow for a petitioner to have a right to
counsel during postconviction proceedings and, if necessary, have
counsel paid for by the State, is the complexity of the science behind
DNA testing. This is especially true considering that petitioners must
state which test they want to use and how it is generally accepted in the
scientific community. 161 Also, assuming the petition contains a sufficient
allegation warranting an answer by the State, the petitioner should be
entitled to help in responding to the State's arguments and opposition.
Although it would be ideal for a state to provide and pay for counsel
as a matter of course when any petitioner wishes to seek assistance, the
sheer number of potential petitions and the budgetary and manpower
constraints on the Office of the Public Defender make providing counsel
for all petitioners practically impossible.1 62 The issue then becomes
when, exactly, should counsel be appointed for a petitioner to strike the
proper balance between the legitimate interests of an inmate and the
interests of the court systems and the State. As the law is written, the
petitioner must survive dismissal as a matter of law. 163 Counsel is also
appointed prior to the critical stages when the petitioner has the option of
responding to the State's answer and filing an amended petition. 164
Even without legal expertise, pro se petitioners do not have an
especially difficult time successfully alleging the requirements for testing
if their case is truly meritorious, as evidenced by the many reported
opinions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 165 However, petitions
may be dismissed for other technical reasons and possibly because the
petitioner has not thought of every last location where exculpatory
evidence may be located. Focusing attention on petitions that state a
particularized prima facie case for relief, as well as meeting all other
requirements, should adequately minimize the number of petitions filed,
making it more manageable for the Office of the Public Defender.
Requiring that a petitioner make his or her initial showing will strike a
balance between an already overworked public defender system, and a
petitioner's right to have the assistance of counsel for when scientifically
complex or other difficult nuances of law become relevant.
See MD. R. 4-704(a)(2)(C).
See STATE OF MARYLAND OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, FISCAL YEAR 2010
ANNUAL REPORT (2010), available at http://www.opd.state.md.uslIndex%20Assets/Annual%
20Report%20FY20 10%20fuldr5.pdf
163
See MD. R. 4-707(a).
164
See MD. R. 4-707(b).
165
See Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007); see also Blake v. State, 395 Md.
213, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (regarding Maryland cases filed pro se).
161

162
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Even considering the above, minor changes are necessary that will
further protect a petitioner's interests. My solution would be to have a
right to counsel upon an allegation that, first, evidence exists and, second,
that evidence, with the result being favorable to the petitioner would,
third, tend to establish factual innocence. Upon satisfying those
requirements, counsel should be appointed to aid the petitioner in their
attempt to establish their actual innocence. Mere technical violations that
cause a petition to be dismissed should not serve as grounds to prevent
the filing of an additional petition. Furthermore, the appointment of
counsel provision should be enacted in section 8-201 instead of the
Maryland Rules. Finally, counsel should be appointed as soon as
practicable after the State has filed an answer. There is no logic in a court
waiting thirty days to assign counsel and the additional time that counsel
has to review the State's answer will strengthen the quality of the petition
and, hopefully, result in fewer postponements resulting from lack of time
to prepare a response.
E. There Should be a Requirement that Eligibility for Relief be Contingent
Upon Identity Being Raised as an Issue at Trial

Maryland's Postconviction DNA Statute does not impose any
restrictions on who may be entitled to DNA testing based on previous
proceedings at trial. I66 The goal of these suggested rules are threefold.
First, they are designed to prevent a petitioner from raising new issues
and alternate theories of the crime, which were not disputed or made an
issue at trial. Second, the statutory scheme must be designed to keep
inmates in prison unless the claim is truly meritorious and they may
possibly prove themselves innocent by making their allegations of
entitlement to relief consistent with arguments raised at trial. At some
point, there must be reasonable limitations on what a petitioner can argue
during postconviction proceedings. Third, such a rule saves the court's
time by allowing a judge to summarily deny those petitions that will
ultimately fail.
Consider a situation in which Timothy was charged, in Maryland, with
the first-degree rape of Mary. At trial, Timothy defended against the
charges by claiming Mary consented. The jury, not believing Mary
consented, convicted Timothy of the crime. Timothy then filed a motion
under section 8-201 for DNA testing of biological evidence that, for the
sake of argument, is material to the case. By electing to defend against
the charge via his argument that the victim consented, Timothy admitted

166

See generally MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (b) (West 2009).
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sexual contact with the victim at or around the time of the alleged rape. 167
Despite that fact, there is no provision in the statute barring Timothy from
filing a motion for DNA testing. 168 To help eliminate such a quandary,
Maryland should require, like many other states, that identity have been
made an issue at some point during prior proceedings. 169 While no
petitioner should be forced to allege mistaken identity as their only
defense at trial, a petitioner should in all practicality argue that they were
not the perpetrator.
The benefit to be derived from DNA evidence arises from its ability to
link biological evidence to an actual person. Petitions to review DNA
evidence should not be used as a vehicle to reexamine factual issues
surrounding the circumstances of crimes that are alleged to have been
committed. Without a requirement that identity must have been made an
issue during prior proceedings, a petitioner filing under section 8-201
could attempt to re-litigate factual issues other than identity, for which the
science behind DNA is simply not useful. 170
F. A Provision Should be Created to Account for the Speed of Scientific
Advancement

The science behind DNA technology is still in its infancy. 171 Since the
mid-1980s, a multitude of different tests 172 have been utilized by law
enforcement agencies around the country, both to conclusively link
suspects to criminal activity and also to clear suspects who may have
otherwise been tried and convicted. 173
Many states have enacted a provision that recognizes that the
technology related to the DNA analysis of biological specimens is still
evolving, and therefore allow for the filing of a new petition for a newer

167
While only a legal admission for purposes of arguing the proffered defense, Timothy
arguing on postconviction that he was not Mary's rapist is not very convincing in light of his
arguments made at trial.
168
Even if DNA testing revealed that the sample used against Timothy at trial was
conclusively established as not being his, this fact should not warrant the reversal of
conviction. Timothy admitted to the sexual contact and just because the DNA was not his
does not erase the fact that the jury chose to disbelieve his version of events.
169
See supra Part III.F, note 1202 and accompanying text.
170
While a petition raising issues other than identity has at best a minimal chance of
being successful, there is currently no limitation barring such a claim as long as the petition
relates to DNA evidence. While a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief could be
established in theory, such a petition would most likely be unsuccessful.
171
See Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.orgiunderstandlUmeliable-Limited-Science.php (last visited November 3,
2011).
172
The most widely used DNA testing methods are RFLP testing and peR testing.
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 26-28.
173
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 2.
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testing method that may be more probative than prior tests. 174 Provisions
in these statutes that allow for further testing, to parallel the advancement
of science, permit a petitioner to file potentially meritorious motions
where prior testing was insufficient to develop a DNA profile capable of
establishing exculpatory evidence. 175 Such a provision allows for a
petitioner to make the same allegations, but have the evidence carrying
potential forensic value retested using a different method of DNA testing
which may yield more probative results.
Imagine a situation where Christopher is serving a life sentence for a
homicide committed during a home invasion. Evidence introduced at
trial included a drop of blood at the crime scene that matched
Christopher's blood type, was conclusively determined to not be the
victim's, and was believed by the police to have belonged to the attacker.
After the enactment of Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute in
2003, Christopher petitioned to have the drop of blood tested for a DNA
profile and agreed to provide a sample of his own DNA for comparison.
Unfortunately, the crime lab that performed the test did not have a
sufficient sample of cells to create a DNA profile of the blood drop from
the crime scene. Accordingly, Christopher's motion for relief was
denied. Now, Christopher wishes to have the same blood drop tested for
DNA analysis for the same purpose using a more advanced form of DNA
testing that requires less biological material than the previous testing
method. A court may be tempted to deny Christopher's motion for
testing given that prior testing did not warrant relief. The judge presiding
over the hearing may erroneously conclude that the testing would not be
any more probative than any other test that was previously conducted. 176
A statutory provision allowing for a new type of test to be performed
on genetic material, which could not be tested previously, protects against
miscarriages of justice based solely on the fact that the motion, while
meritorious, was simply filed before a test delivering meaningful results
could be performed. Maryland, like other jurisdictions, should add a
provision allowing a petitioner to have DNA evidence tested again. That
provision should be conditioned on: (1) a sufficient showing that a newly
developed method of testing would yield more probative results, or that
prior testing utilizing the same method was for some reason unreliable;
and (2) there is sufficient genetic material left for testing. The rapid
See supra Part III.E, note 11920 and accompanying text.
See id.
176
While this is an extreme example, this and other analogous factual scenarios could
occur. As of now there is nothing barring the filing of more than one motion under section 8201, but a difficult judge may still find as fact that no reasonable probability of the discovery
of mitigating evidence exists. By finding as fact that the new test does not stand a better
chance of producing results probative of innocence, a judge in his or her discretion could
possibly block a meritorious petition that has a reasonable probability of being successful.
174

175
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advancement of technology, and the fact that DNA can sometimes be
tested decades after a sample was collected, also justifies states imposing
no time restriction on how long after a conviction a motion for
postconviction DNA testing may be filed. 177
G. There Should be a Requirement that a Petitioner May Only File a
Motion if They are Presently Incarcerated

Interestingly enough, it is conceivable for an innocent person to be
released from prison and still be eligible for exculpatory postconviction
DNA testing under section 8_201. 178 Even after release, persons
convicted of certain crimes in Maryland will have certain limitations on
civil rights and liberties. 179 While some of the restrictions on those who
have served time in prison are, in some cases, substantial, the statute
should be designed to provide relief only to those who are having their
most precious right taken away from them-freedom. Again, such a rule
should be implemented to protect the courts from having to deal with a
potentially limitless amount of motions that have, at best, only a minimal
chance of being successful and will only provide a marginal amount of
relief when compared to the relief of those petitions coming from those
who are presently incarcerated. When weighing the value of freedom
against the restoration of rights taken as a result of a criminal conviction,
petitioners who are already free from incarceration should not be
pennitted to file a petition in the interest of judicial economy.
Furthermore, the volume of petitions coming from persons who are not
incarcerated could end up eclipsing otherwise meritorious petitions from
inmates whose convictions might seriously be questioned.
The financial burden on all parties, when weighed against the potential
relief by someone who is not even incarcerated, should also be
considered. Substantial costs will be incurred by the Office of the Public
177
See innocence Project Asks Virginia Appeals Court to Clear a Richmond Man Who
Has Served Nearly 27 Years for Rapes He Didn't Commit, INNOCENCE PROJECT,

http://www.innocenceproject.orgiContentJInnocence_Project_Asks_ Virginia_Appeals_Court_
to _ Clear_a_Richmond_Man_Who_Has_Served_Nearly_27_ YearsJor_ Rapes_He_Didnt_Co
mmit.php (last visited Sept. 29,2011).
178
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b) (West 2009) (containing no restriction as
to who may apply for DNA testing of biological evidence. In theory a petitioner previously
released from prison could conceivably file a motion for relief under this subsection up until
the time of their death).
179
See CRIM. PROC. §§ ll-70l to 727 (regarding sex offender registration); see also MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(2) (West 201l) (regarding persons convicted of felonies
or misdemeanors for which they were sentenced to incarceration for one year or longer cannot
own firearms); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-L03(b)(4) (West 2011) (regarding
persons who received a sentence for a crime punishable by greater than six months
incarceration are not qualified to serve on a jury). Apart from the legal consequences of
having served time behind bars, the stigma of having a felony conviction may affect one's
ability to find employment and strain other social relationships.
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Defender in representing the petitioner l8o , the State's Attorney's Office in
defending the conviction, and, finally, the court in both pecuniary terms
and in the time it takes to hear the petition. 181 Furthermore, an individual
who is not incarcerated and seeks postconviction relief because of
significant collateral consequences stemming from the conviction may
file a writ of coram nobis-a civil action challenging a judgment based
on an error of fact. 182
H. ReliefShould Not be Allowed When the Petitioner Pled Guilty

Maryland courts have yet to decide whether petitioners who pled
guilty to crimes retain the right to make a motion for postconviction DNA
testing, and the Maryland Legislature has either consciously left such a
decision for the courts or has overlooked the possibility that such a
situation might arise. 183 The argument against barring a motion is that the
petitioner may have pled guilty on the advice of defense counsel who
believed, with the State's evidence, that the petitioner would be convicted
and sentenced to life in prison. Instead, defense counsel negotiated a plea
arrangement with the State's Attorney handling the case in which the
potential petitioner would serve a shorter sentence in prison. Acting on
advice of counsel, the petitioner accepted the deal.
On the other hand, plea bargains limit the effectiveness of
postconviction DNA petitions in several ways. 184 To have DNA testing
ordered in Maryland, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that
testing will produce exculpatory evidence. 185 Under most circumstances,
the facts alleged in a petition for postconviction relief will necessarily, in
part, be drawn from the trial record. 186 However, when there was a guilty
plea, there is no detailed trial record, no witness testimony, and often
there is only a minimal factual investigation on the part of the State and
defense counsel. I87 Thus, both the defense's factual quest to establish
180
This does assume that the petitioner is indigent and either unable or unwilling to hire
private counsel.
181
The substantial costs can be thought of in terms of manpower, time, etc. This also
includes depriving the Office of the Public Defender of valuable time that could be spent on
other petitions that have a greater chance of being successful, as well as other functions of the
office.
182
Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78, 760 A.2d 647,661 (2000); see also MD. R. 15-1201 to
1207.
183
Courts in other jurisdictions have answered the question of whether a petitioner who
pled guilty may later bring a motion to test DNA evidence from a crime scene. Unless the
legislature makes a decision sometime in the near future, this issue stands a strong chance of
being addressed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See Stone, supra note 129, at 50-51 n.
18-19.
184
Stone, supra note 129, at 56.
185
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d) (West 2009).
186
Stone, supra note 129, at 57.
187
Stone, supra note 129, at 56-57.
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innocence as well as the State's attempt to refute innocence are hindered
by the inherent gaps available in evidence in cases in which the petitioner
pled guilty.188 Petitions stemming from a conviction following a guilty
plea should thus be denied.
/. Petitioner Should be Required to Allege a Sufficient Chain of Custody

The Maryland legislature should enact a requirement that the
petitioner show a chain of custody sufficient to demonstrate that the
evidence to be tested has not been tampered with or otherwise
compromised. While it would not be prudent to require an inmate to
show a perfect chain of custody, requiring the petitioner to show a
reasonable probability that no tampering occurred is manageable.
Practically speaking, it will be very difficult for a defendant to prove
beyond any doubt that evidence was not tampered with, principally
because he is making an allegation about the present state of evidence not
within his direct control. Also, establishing a reasonable probability is
equivalent to the burden held by the State in proving its case. 189
V. CONCLUSION
Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute, as currently written,
provides an avenue for those charged with the most violent crimes to
prove their factual innocence. 190 The Maryland General Assembly should
limit what petitioners seek to prove l91 , expedite claims that show merit l92 ,
and create rules that would be helpful in quickly denying frivolous
petitions and those which have no chance of success. 193
By mandating that a petitioner must seek to prove actual innocence,
the possibility that an inmate may seek only to establish that their
sentence was improper, an end that analysis of DNA evidence is simply
not able to accomplish, would be eliminated. 194 An argument that a
petitioner wishes to show mitigating evidence relating to the crime they
committed would also be preempted by such a change in the letter of the
law. While arguments that relevant evidence other than DNA was not
considered, or that a sentence is excessive in light of what a petitioner
was convicted for, do have their place during the appellate and
postconviction processes, those arguments have no place in a motion for
Stone, supra note 129, at 57-58.
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DNA analysis simply because any result would not be sufficiently
probative towards arguing those points. 195
By extension, Maryland should reword the relief portion of the statute
so that it mandates the denial of relief absent a showing of actual
innocence. The statutory scheme should not be designed to provide relief
after DNA testing reveals only a possibility that a petitioner is
innocent. l96 The term "favorable" in the relief portion of the statute is a
loosely defined term that could be stretched to the extreme end of
awarding a new trial if DNA testing proves to be inconclusive. 197
While an increased burden on the court system may result by
expanding the list of offenses for which a petitioner is eligible for relief
under section 8-201, the end result of providing greater access to justice
is more thoroughly preserved. 198
Additionally, Assistant State's
Attorneys are not restricted to using DNA evidence only for the
prosecution of rapes and murders. 199 Logically speaking, and although
the case will certainly be rare where a burglar is able to prove their
innocence through the use of DNA evidence, inmates should have a
means to test this evidence because it is equally probative in proving
innocence as it is in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 200
Requiring an inmate to have argued identity at some point during their
trial for a section 8-20 I petition to be considered for review guarantees
that they will only be seeking review about an issue that DNA testing has
the capability to prove. 201 Such a rule also helps to guarantee that a
petitioner is not simply filing the motion in a long shot attempt to rai se an
issue that likely was not previously mentioned, but also places a burden
on the petitioner to, at minimum, make an argument that is not entirely
different from a defense they were committed to establishing at tria1. 202
The technology of DNA testing is constantly evolving203 and DNA
evidence can be preserved for decades after a crime occurS. 204 In light of
this, Maryland should amend to include a provision that allows for the
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retesting of DNA evidence under section 8-201 when a new fonn of
testing may be more probative than the previous method of testing. 205
While requiring that a petitioner be incarcerated will, in nearly all
circumstances, be more of a fonnality than a bar to relief, such a rule is
necessary for the expediency of the courts as well as limiting the
litigation of issues when the time for review has simply come to pass. 206
Furthennore, people who are not in prison and wish to establish their
factual innocence may file a writ of coram nobis, which would be more
proper for someone who is not incarcerated. 207
Neither the legislature nor the Maryland courts have made any
detennination about whether a petitioner may apply for relief under
section 8-201 after pleading guilty.20S There are some compelling reasons
to justify allowing petitioners who pled guilty to seek relief, however,
there is also no way to definitively establish that DNA testing will be
probative of a claim of innocence. Because it is most likely that neither
side, after the plea agreement, attempted to develop any factual account
of the crime, it is impossible in plea bargaining to detennine exactly what
the presence or absence of DNA material from a crime scene actually
means?09
There is a chain of custody requirement for postconviction DNA relief
in most jurisdictions, but Maryland has not yet enacted this
requirement. 2IO Accordingly, section 8-201 should be amended so that a
defendant must establish, at the bare minimum, that the evidence was not
tampered with or altered. 211
Maryland's statutory scheme governing postconviction DNA relief
petitions is imperfect. Maryland should take certain cues from other
jurisdictions and create rules designed to prevent miscarriages of justice.
The Maryland Legislature, in the interest of expeditiously freeing those
wrongfully convicted and keeping those who do not deserve their
freedom behind bars, should amend section 8-201 as necessary to further
the suggested goals of the statutory scheme. 212
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